From the old press: The Story of the Mostar Resistance and the Mostar Battalion
Nusret Seferović, Article series: The Partisan Mostar Part 1
In July 1941, the Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) for Herzegovina, together with the local party organization in Mostar, attempted to send a larger group of armed communists from the city to the Eastern Herzegovina region to organize and develop the uprising.
Between August 15 and 20, a group of 28 communists, led by Savo Medan, managed to leave the city and reach their designated location. The detachment departed after 9 p.m. from the Bjelušine neighborhood, armed with 16 rifles, each supplied with 150 rounds. Each fighter also carried a revolver and at least two “Kragujevka” rifles.
The detachment included the following comrades: Karlo Batko, a worker; Danilo Milićević, a high school student; the Vujović brothers—Slavko and Sveto, intellectuals; Boro Zurovac, Boro Radan, and Ranko Mihić, a high school student; the Avdalović brothers—Boro, Ljubo, and Momčilo (Mladen), intellectuals; Luka Knežić, a worker; Andrija Staić, an aviation officer of the former Yugoslav army; Živko Vuković, a high school student; Boro Balać, a worker; Salko Pezo, a high school student; Pero Lažetić, a worker; Hasan Bubić, a worker; Neđo Bitanga, a worker; Života Neimarović, a worker; Aziz Koluder, a worker; Rade Salatić, a worker; Petar Krajina, a worker; Remzija Duranović, a worker; Nenad
Vasić, a student; Obrad Slijepčević and Vasko Gnjatić,
workers. When the detachment set out, they were seen off by Avdo Humo and Muhamed Grebo.
During the night, the detachment carefully passed by the
villages below Velež and took shelter the next day under the highest peak of the mountain. The following night, without a guide, they navigated the rugged terrain using a map and compass. They descended near the Muslim village of Sopilja, a Ustaše stronghold in Nevesinje Field, and passed between Ustaše guards under the cover of night. At dawn, they reached the Mostar–Nevesinje road near the church in Kifino Selo, from where they moved on to the village of Bratač. The villagers welcomed them warmly, providing food and shelter before they continued through the villages of Donji Drežanj—where they encountered Obren Ivković and Brana Kovačević—and Gornji Lukavac, where they stayed for two to three days while Savo Medan and Nenad Vasić set out to meet Miro Popara. Once contact was established, the detachment proceeded to Fatnica, where fighting had already begun.
On August 27, the insurgents had eliminated the enemy
garrison at Divin, and the battle had moved toward Plana. The detachment immediately joined the fight. Alongside other communists and sympathizers, this group fought against both the Ustaše and looting and pogrom-driven factions that were also involved in the siege of Plana. That same day, Plana was captured, and the fighting shifted toward Bileća.
“The units under our influence, or rather our comrades
within those units,” reported Uglješa Danilović in his September 17 report to Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo on the military-political situation in Eastern Herzegovina, “tried to steer the battle in a different direction. Thanks to these efforts, a massacre of the Muslim population in Bileća was prevented. Our units protected the Muslim neighborhoods, but they could not stop the looting of shops (many Serbian-owned stores were also looted) by marauding gangs…”
To Various Parts of Herzegovina
After these battles, according to the pre-established plan
made before their departure from Mostar—with only minor personal adjustments—the comrades from the detachment split into smaller groups and were sent to different regions of Herzegovina.
For example, Ranko Mihić and the Avdalović brothers were
sent to the Gacko region, Karlo Batko and Danilo Milićević to the Stolac area, Rade Salatić to Trebinje, and Savo Medan and Života Neimarović to Nevesinje. With the help of comrades they found there, they formed one of the first
Partisan battalions in Herzegovina, Nevesinjska puška (“The
Nevesinje Rifle”). The battalion commander was Dukica Grahovac, a local peasant, with Obren Ivković as his deputy, while the political commissar was Savo Medan, and his deputy was Života Neimarović.
Later, 13 more men moved north, though there were no reports about them at the time. However, in a report dated September 8, the Regional Headquarters for Herzegovina and Lepa Perović informed the Headquarters of the People’s Liberation Movement for Bosnia and Herzegovina, stating, “We hope to receive their reports soon.”
Based on reports received from the field and accounts from
comrades who had returned to the city, Avdo Humo, outlining the military-political situation in Eastern Herzegovina, informed Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo that armed units had been organized in villages across the
following districts: Trebinje, Bileća, Nevesinje, Gacko, and Stolac, and that district headquarters had been established.
In Northern Herzegovina
While traveling through Herzegovina, Uglješa Danilović stayed in the northern part of the region, near Konjic, for three to four days. “Two days after my arrival,” he wrote in his already mentioned report to Svetozar Vukmanović, “a detachment of nine men arrived there, and before me, three comrades had already reached the area.”
These comrades had been sent from Mostar to the Konjic district to prepare for the arrival of more fighters and to organize the uprising in the region. “Immediately after the detachment arrived,” the report continues, “we called a general assembly attended by 30 to 40 people. I explained the purpose of our arrival, the situation, and the battles in other areas. Everyone present supported taking action, but the available equipment was very limited. However, with what we had, it was possible to begin operations. Our first objective was to clear the area of enemy forces, which consisted of several small garrisons. According to the intelligence we had, these actions could be carried out with minimal casualties. At the same time, we started disarming enemy-sympathetic civilians.”
Relations between the Muslim and Serbian populations in that area were significantly better than in other parts of Herzegovina. “People themselves recognize the necessity of cooperation, as only through unity can we achieve complete success in our actions,” Danilović noted. During the general assembly, the detachment was divided into units, and preparations were made to form three companies. Before departing, he emphasized to his comrades the importance of swift action.
How and Where the Detachments Left the City
Determining the exact number of detachments that left Mostar over the four years of the People’s Liberation War is difficult, as no one systematically recorded this information. However, it is known that almost every month, at least one detachment would leave the city, and in certain periods, detachments departed every two or three days.
Couriers or comrades who were already part of the Partisan units, and who knew the escape routes well, would lead these detachments out of Mostar.
Among those who most frequently led detachments out of Mostar were: Vasilije Maslo-Vaso, Alija Kreso, Šerif Bubić, Vojo Ivanišević, Meho Trbonja, Petar Krajina, Hidajet Šarić, Pavle Neimarović, as well as Enes Orman, Mustafa Alikalfić – Brko, Huso Vuk, Safet Dizdar, Tofik Demirović, and others.
Detachments typically departed from various neighborhoods, including Carina, Mazoljice, Brankovac, Bjelušine, Luka, and Donja Mahala. Until mid-1942, when Partisan units temporarily withdrew from Herzegovina, Mostar detachments were sent partially to southern Herzegovina but predominantly to the north. In that region, near Borci—between Mostar and Konjic—the Partisan battalion known as the Mostar Batalion was formed..
Footnotes:
1) In Mostar, any group of people heading towards liberated territory to join Partisan military units was referred to as a detachment, regardless of its size. Participants would secretly gather at two or three locations across the city, following prior instructions from the underground organization regarding time and place. Once outside the city, these groups would formally organize into detachments.
They most frequently assembled in private homes, such as those of Života Neimarović, Lazo Radišić, Anica Milić, Milica Samardžić, Elezović, Patak, Avdo Arap, Vasko Gnjatić, Osman Šantić, Meho Zalihić, Fikret Vila, Ahmet Jehović, Avdo Pavlović, Memnuna Hadžiosmanović, Imšir Gigić, and Deronja. Other gathering points included the Orthodox cemetery, an abandoned house once belonging to Mića Bejat, the Alikalfić house in Brankovac, and a deserted home in Ševa’s Vineyard.
2) Života Neimarović: A worker and a member of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) since 1940. He was captured by Chetniks during the withdrawal of Partisan forces from Herzegovina and handed over to the Italians. He was executed in the summer of 1942.
3) meaning the Konjic Area: In early September, a detachment left Mostar for the Konjic region. The group included Nijaz Šarić, Osman Grebo-Osa, Šaćir Palata, Hasan Bubić, Memal Dragnić, and Aziz Koluder. Upon arrival in Konjic, they were joined by Nono Belša and Muhamed Pirkić.
A few days earlier, on September 5, Salko Fejić, Alija Delić, and one other comrade, whose name remains unknown, also left Mostar..
(To be continued)
Source: Borba
Nusret Seferović: The Partisan Mostar Part 2
The detachments usually exited between the hills of Stolac
and Veliki Kuk or between Stolac and Pudari, moving very cautiously past enemy
guards. From there, they continued their route between the villages of Dobrča
and Pošipovci to Maslopolje, then across Brasina to Prišek. From there, the
path continued either through Mlinići—when there were no Chetniks—or via
Pločenj, then to Klanac and Prijevorac, across the Zijemlje Field to Zeravac,
and from there over Golo Brdo to the village of Kušići. The detachments would
stop there at the house of Marko Kurteš and Danilo Gatalo. After a short rest,
the journey continued through the “Black Forest,” past the village of
Česi, below Rat-Kamen, to Čemerno, then from Čemerno to Planica, and down the
Okuke road to the Glavatičevo region, continuing to Boračko Lake, where the
battalion headquarters was located.
For some time, until mid-1942, while strong partisan detachments and liberated territories still existed in eastern Herzegovina, a shorter route was also used: from Zijemlje via Hansko Polje, Bahtijevići, across Lipet and Kula, to Boračko Lake.
For Southern Herzegovina…
For southern Herzegovina, the journey followed one of two
routes: the first went through Kričani, below Svinjarina, Banjdoli, and
Kokorina to Prijeki Gromovi, then across the Mostar–Nevesinje road, between
Žulje and Rabina, reaching Udrežnje, where partisan units were stationed. The
second route passed through Zijemlje, Lakta, Umčani, and Odžak to Lukavac,
where the headquarters of the Nevesinje Rifle battalion was located.
When, in mid-1942, partisan units were forced to temporarily withdraw from
Herzegovina to western Bosnia, Mostar remained far behind them. Nevertheless,
recruitment of fighters from the city for the partisan army did not stop.
Among others, this was reported by Vaso Miskin, a member of
the Provincial Committee. In a report from the newly formed Regional Party
Committee for Herzegovina, Hamo Grebo wrote on September 20, 1942:
“Comrades from the Municipal Committee have
established contact with the organization in Jablanica and the 1st Mostar
Battalion. They will strive to transfer all illegal fighters and compromised
comrades to the partisans as soon as possible. Transfers were successfully
carried out individually, and through the railway workers’ organization, people
were being moved almost daily from Mostar to Jablanica or Ostrožac, and from
there to the first units of the 10th Herzegovina Brigade and other partisan detachments.”
However, there were situations where these efforts were not
enough. One such problem arose precisely when the enemy controlled Herzegovina,
and the authorities of the so-called Independent State of Croatia (NDH) took
advantage of this situation by enforcing conscription into their army. In his
report, Grebo further stated:
“In the city, conscription is being carried out for
young men born in 1921, 1922, 1923, and 1924. Even a single day’s delay results
in a military court sentence. We informed the Mostar Battalion to find a
suitable location and make a plan to stop the train transporting the 1923
conscripts to Varaždin. We will notify them at least two days in advance.”
Some of these recruits never even boarded the train, as the
youth organization helped them hide and later sent them to the partisan
detachments through “normal” routes.
Due to the high number of people wanting to join the
partisan units and the party organization’s efforts to send as many fighters as
possible from the city to the army, all the existing escape routes proved
insufficient. Seeking new exits, at the end of July 1942, one detachment left
the city in broad daylight via a new route: through Raška Gora, below Goranci,
then across Čvrsnica and Plaša, finally reaching Doljani.
Although the detachment had been spotted, it successfully reached our units despite passing through unknown, mountainous, and rugged terrain for the first time.
In a report from the Sjenčina gendarmerie station dated July 27, 1942, sent to the district authorities in Mostar, it was stated:
“On July 26, 1942, Karlo Rajić, the elder of the village of Gornja Prežnica, reported to this station that a group of 20 rebels had moved from Mostar and was heading toward Duvno. This group of rebels is well-armed with rifles, machine guns, and bombs. The rebels remained on July 26 in the Čvrsnica mountains, at a place called ‘Težovnica,’ until nightfall.”
The station commander, Sergeant Blažević, reported that “no measures were taken because the station only has ten gendarmes, and it must also be secured every night with the available armed forces.”
In early spring 1943, a partisan detachment was formed in Hrasno, between Stolac and Ljubinje. The city was under blockade, and the road to Hrasno was long and full of obstacles. However, two routes were found:
- The first route led from Bjelušine or Luka to Svinjarina, Banjdol, Kružalj, Kokorina, Prijeki Grom, between Žulje and Okolišta, above Vranjevići to Hodovo, then between Kozice and Trijebanj to Lokve, Prenj, across the Bregava River to Hairlići and Hrasno.
- The second route started from Donja Mahala, following the railway tracks, passing between Čekrk—where an Italian bunker was located—and Hum, then through the pass to the Mostar–Jasenica road, near the airfield towards the Neretva River.
A short break was taken at the abandoned Mujić house, where the group waited for others, as only small groups could move up to that point. From there, the detachments moved along the right bank of the Neretva towards Baćevići, arriving before dawn. They stayed at the home of Dragutin Škoro, where the detachment would rest for the day. Security was ensured both by the detachment’s own guards and by local villagers.
The following night, the detachment crossed the Neretva in small boats. On the other side, Žarko Šupljeglav had organized their reception. The detachments then continued through Hodbine, Rotimlja, between Stanojevići and Trijebanj to Lokve, then near Aladinići across the Mostar–Stolac road to Prenj, across the Bregava River to Hairlići, and finally to Hrasno.
At Rotimlja, the detachment was usually met by a member of the District Party Committee for the Stolac region.
All the detachments that attempted to reach Hrasno during this period failed to reach their destination.
One detachment was crushed in mid-April 1943 before it even reached Hodbine. Many comrades were captured by Italian and Chetnik forces. To avoid falling into enemy hands, Neđo Bitanga—who had previously returned to the city from the field but was now attempting to escape again—threw a grenade under himself and died.
Another detachment, which had just set out to meet the 10th Herzegovina Brigade (which was advancing from northern Herzegovina towards Hrasno), was attacked and destroyed.
Enemy documents recorded the tragedy of this large group of young communists.
On July 5, 1943, the commander of the Blagaj gendarmerie station, Sergeant Mujo Džonko, reported to the Velika Župa Hum in Mostar:
*”On July 4, 1943, around 2:30 AM, about 200 German SS troops, along with three officers, arrived in Blagaj from Mostar. They requested that the gendarmes from this station guide them and show them the way to Kaluđer Bunar and towards Stjepan Krst. Gendarme Rašid Krupalija and auxiliary officer Osman Mutilović were sent with them. When they arrived at Kaluđer Bunar around 10 AM, near Stjepan Krst, the troops advanced and encountered a group of partisans, immediately engaging them in combat.
During the clash, 8 partisans were killed, 3 were wounded, and 23 were captured. The captured weapons included 1 mortar, 1 heavy machine gun, and 39 rifles.”*
Since part of the group managed to retreat, “the troops continued pursuing the partisans towards Dabrica.”
(To be continued…).
Source: Borba
Nusret Seferović: The Partisan Mostar Part 3
The Germans took the captured prisoners and later executed them at Mostarsko Blato (aka Ovojci). Among those executed was Mladen Balorda.
Who Joined the Detachments?
Not all detachments had the same number of members. For example:
- The detachment from October 5, 1941, had 28 people.
- The one from December 25 had 27.
- The detachment from March 21, 1942, had 23 members.
- The one from October 15, 1943, had 40.
- The detachment from November 10 had 30.
- The one from January 14, 1944, had 54 members.
- The detachment from February 17 had 30.
Primarily, activists sought by the police—who were not essential for underground work in the city—were sent to partisan detachments. Likewise, patriots who wanted to take up arms and fight for the freedom of the people joined the ranks.
Almost every individual who left the city to join a detachment was equipped with weapons, ammunition, medical supplies, and propaganda materials. The detachments regularly carried rifles, ammunition, medicine, surgical instruments, literature, and writing materials (paper, pencils, ink, pens, carbon paper, mimeographs, typewriters) to the partisan units they were heading toward.
For instance, on October 17, 1941, a detachment of 19 people carried 40 rifles, around 6,000 rounds of ammunition, over 80 hand grenades, and 30 military raincoats. The detachment from March 21, 1942, carried, among other things, an entire field surgical hospital.
All this material was gathered—and the mobilization efforts carried out—by Party and youth (SKOJ) organizations, the Women’s Antifascist Front (AFŽ), National Liberation Committees, and People’s Aid Committees. Everything was coordinated through a special technical apparatus under the leadership of the Local Committee of the Party.
Although the organization and departure of these detachments were kept in strict secrecy, the enemy was aware of their existence and of the constant, almost daily movement between the city and the liberated territory. They sought to capture people or at least prevent their departure from the city. For example, in March 1942, the Ustaša police learned about the departure of a large group from Luka. They managed to seize medical supplies and other materials prepared for the detachment, but they did not capture anyone. Despite the alarm and the deployment of a large number of Italian soldiers and their security forces around the city—including the use of searchlights—everyone still managed to leave the city. The enemy organized ambushes within the city, outside of it, and in the surrounding areas where they suspected the detachments would pass. However, the detachments always successfully avoided encounters with the enemy before leaving the city. Nevertheless, over the course of four years, there were instances when the enemy managed to set up an ambush in the right place. In such cases, the detachments – or individuals who were leaving alone – responded with gunfire as a rule.
The First Armed Clash with the Ustaše in the City
It happened around noon on July 31, 1941, in Donja Mahala Street. A truck full of Ustaše, led by Mirko Buhač, stopped just below the Luka Bridge. With their rifles aimed, the Ustaše stormed into the courtyard of the Vuković house.
At that moment, inside the house, a group of communists was holding a meeting: Slobodan Vuković, Ahmed Sefić, Mahmud Đikić, Mustafa Husković i Jusuf Čevro. Slobodan was the first to spot the Ustaše in the courtyard. Without hesitation, he fired at them with his revolver. His mother, Zlata, sprang into action, unscrewing the fuse of a hand grenade and shouting to her comrades:
— “Run… I’ll hold them here…”
She then threw the grenade into the courtyard among the Ustaše. An explosion followed, accompanied by screams. The more composed Ustaše returned fire, but the communists took advantage of the moment and escaped from the house. Two hours later, in the courtyard of the gymnasium, Zlata Vuković was executed along with Ahmed Sefić, a technician, and Vera and Dejan Popović, a law student. That same day, posters announcing their execution were plastered across the city.
The Ustaše soon managed to capture Slobodan Vuković and Jusuf Čevro. That evening, on August 1, 1941, Ivo Herenčić, an “Ustaša captain of the Poglavnik’s bodyguard battalion,” reported that:
— “The communists—Slobodan Vuković, a 22-year-old graduate technician, an Orthodox Christian from Mostar, and Jusuf Čevro, a 27-year-old tailor’s assistant, a Muslim from Mostar—were captured and immediately executed.
However, later in 1942, the kidnapped Ustaša member Čavo stated during his interrogation before the Partisan court that Vuković and Čevro were not executed immediately. They were brutally tortured in an attempt to make them betray their comrades. Slobodan told the Ustašas only this:
— Yes, I am a communist. I know where many comrades are hiding, but—it’s all in vain for you!
Seeing him battered yet unbroken, Herenčić grew concerned:
— If all communists are like this… we will achieve nothing against them.
Čevro’s stance only reinforced this belief. Both men were executed at Ovojcima near Široki Brijeg.
No one from Gojko Vuković’s family lived to see the liberation
Zlata was the wife, and Slobodan the son of Gojko Vuković, who in 1907 participated in the formation of the first trade unions and, in 1909, the first organizations of the Social Democratic Party in Mostar and Herzegovina. He belonged to the left wing of the Social Democratic Party. In mid-1918, he was elected to the Mostar National Council. He had been a member of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) since its founding. At the Vukovar Congress in 1920, he was elected to the Central Council of the KPJ and remained a member of the Party’s Central Committee until his death.
At the end of 1920, he organized the Regional Party Conference, where he was elected to the Executive Committee of the regional leadership. That same year, he was the bearer of the district party list in the parliamentary elections. In May 1932, he attended the Second Party Conference in Vienna, followed by the Third Congress of the Party, also in Vienna.
When the Provincial Committee of the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina was established in 1927, he was elected as a member. In 1928, he traveled illegally under the name Karlo Hotiček to Moscow for the Sixth Congress of the Comintern. After the congress, as part of a delegation, he toured the Soviet Union. On that occasion, at a rally in Baku in honor of the delegation, he addressed the audience on behalf of the Yugoslav proletariat.
After the January 6, 1929, dictatorship was established, he was arrested (he had been arrested several times before) and sentenced to three years in prison and five years of loss of civil rights. He was released from prison on May 23, 1933. He died on July 6, 1934, in a work accident as a member of the Central Committee of the KPJ.
Proleter, the official organ of the KPJ, wrote about his death in August 1934:
“The working class of Yugoslavia and the Communist Party have once again lost one of the first among the first, the best among the best of the old guard of revolutionary fighters.”
His eldest son, Mladen, a high school student, was arrested for political reasons in Sarajevo in 1936, 1937, and 1938 and put on trial. He joined the National Liberation Struggle in 1941 and was killed in eastern Bosnia in 1942.
Gojko’s daughter, Radojka, participated in the National Liberation Struggle from 1941. After the Battle of Sutjeska, exhausted, she was captured by Chetniks and executed.
His youngest son, Rade, was a political commissar of a youth company in the 29th Herzegovina Division in 1944. He was killed at Ivan-Sedlo in March 1945.
No one from Gojko Vuković’s family survived to see the liberation.
Women’s Demonstrations
That morning, on December 3, 1941, it was colder than usual in the Mostar valley.
From time to time, the monotonous voices of newspaper vendors could be heard on the city streets. Shivering in their worn-out clothes, they hopped from foot to foot, shouting the names of newspapers and the headlines about German victories on the Eastern Front.
— “Viktorija!” they added as the obligatory refrain.
— “There it is on the market for you…” the passersby responded.
(“Viktorija” (Victory) was one of the main propaganda symbols of fascism during World War II.)
(To be continued…)
Source: Borba
Nusret Seferović: Partizanski Mostar 4. dio
— “…You can buy it for kunas…” many locals mockingly retorted as they hurried to the market, looking to buy turnips as they did every day—and, if by chance available, some other vegetables too.
By around 10 o’clock, several hundred older and younger women had gathered at the market.
— “Come on, turnips, people!” the vendors called out from behind their stalls from time to time, hopping from foot to foot to keep warm.
— “You eat it yourself, then shout louder…”
— “Viktorija!” some joked sarcastically.
More and more women kept arriving. They weren’t buying anything, but they weren’t leaving either. In their chatter that morning, at first, there were only vague murmurs of discontent… and then a group of twenty to thirty women passed through, chanting:
— “Viktorija! Viktorija!”—turnips started flying off the stalls.
Then, they took to the streets. Many other women joined them.
We Want Bread!
“When they arrived at the city administration building, most of them remained outside, shouting: ‘We want bread!’ Meanwhile, a few women entered the building, intending to reach Mayor Muhamed Butum,” wrote the head of the district police department, Mate Roko, in his report to the Great County of Hum in Mostar.
“Since neither the Mayor nor the Deputy Mayor were in the office,” the women—protesters—headed to the Mayor’s residence. On their way, they shouted ‘Bread, bread, we are hungry!’ and similar slogans, continuing their chants even in front of Butum’s home. The mayor, who was bedridden due to illness, was inside, and the frightened cries of his wife led her to allow five protesters into his room. There, they demanded an increase in the bread ration from 4.5 to 9 kilograms per person per month, as well as a supply of lard and potatoes for the city.
Shortly after, a city official arrived at Butum’s residence and witnessed his conversation with the demonstrators. Once the mayor assured them that he would do everything in his power, the protesters exited the house and relayed the outcome to the crowd outside. Most of the women dispersed, but a group of around 50—mainly younger demonstrators—marched toward the city market, where they continued their protest for a short time before eventually disbanding.
However, according to the memories of participants, a far greater number of women took part than was stated in the report. The figures were deliberately downplayed to minimize the significance of the mass women’s protest and to reduce the authorities’ own accountability.
The police, however, clearly understood that the protest was not merely economic but also political in nature.
The report listed the names of those arrested—Pava Miletić, Bira Dizdarević, Muruveta Ćemalović, and Zehra Vejzović—while a warrant was issued for the arrest of Grebina and Arpadžić, under suspicion of being the instigators. The report also claimed that these individuals were relatively well-off, and since they were known to the authorities as prominent communists, there was suspicion that the demonstration had a communist agenda.
The Great County of Hum in Mostar forwarded this police report to the Ministry of the Interior in Zagreb, along with a commentary stating that the street demonstrations were “a propaganda effort by communists, who, unfortunately, are numerous in Mostar, especially among Muslims.” But they did not stop at that statement; they went further, suggesting:
“It is absolutely necessary to designate a location for a concentration camp for communists, where the most prominent ones should be immediately sent as a first measure.”
To this end, they proposed that a commissioner of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) coordinate with the Italian authorities in Sušak to facilitate this action with the occupiers.
“Only in this way,” the report concluded, “can Mostar be rid of these destructive elements, against whom, due to their calculated actions, nothing can be proven.”
From that moment on, neither the authorities nor the Ustaša organizations mindlessly parroted the word “Viktorija” anymore. After this event, the word became associated with turnips rather than fascist victory. Even newspaper vendors were banned from shouting “Viktorija!” when announcing articles about German military victories on the Eastern Front.
Thus, the most frequently used fascist propaganda slogan in Mostar suffered a political defeat.
One Arrival and One Farewell
The Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Lakša, reported from Mostar on the situation as of October 19, 1941, stating:
“On October 17 at noon, General Ambrosio, commander of the Italian 2nd Army, arrived along with the commander of the 6th Corps and the commander of the 32nd Division. Representatives of our authorities and clergy were present, along with an Italian honor company and all Italian officers. From our Domobrani (Home Guard), an honor company with a military band was present, as well as all of our staff officers.
There Were No More Than a Hundred Citizens, Mostly Women.
After the welcome ceremony, an honorary company parade took place, after which the general expressed his gratitude and recognition for the conduct of our company.”
It seems that Lakša was satisfied with the presence of “no more than a hundred citizens.” Precisely because of this, it can be assumed that even this number is exaggerated—likely inflated due to the otherwise low turnout.
Now, here is another enemy report from May 1943:
“On the 5th of this month, at 7 PM, 15 arrested communists and communist sympathizers, mostly members of the local SKOJ (League of Communist Youth), who had been detained since January, were taken by the Carabinieri by train to Metković and then further to Šibenik. Before their departure, a large group of citizens gathered in front of the courthouse where they were imprisoned, but the guards dispersed them. The crowd then spread along the railway tracks all the way to the ‘Malta’ winch at the outskirts of Mostar. There were approximately 1,000 people. As the arrested communists boarded the train carriage, they began singing songs… ‘This land of ours is long and sorrowful.’
However, according to the recollections of participants, the actual number was far greater than what the police chief reported. From then on, deportations to interment camps were carried out at night or during city-wide curfews.
The City as a Volcano – Political Conditions in Mostar
Based on received reports, the Grand Župan sent a document titled “Report on the Situation in Mostar” on July 15, 1942, to the Plenipotentiary of the Minister of the Interior for the Grand Župas of Vrhbosna, Hum, Usora, and Soli in Sarajevo. The report stated:
“The political situation in Mostar is unbearable. Mostar, generally speaking, is a volcano—one spark is enough to ignite it. The city is infected with communism, which has primarily taken hold among the lower social classes. Elements engaged in secret communist propaganda are attempting to attract high school youth to their cause… Parents and schools are struggling to resist this propaganda because it is being carried out very cautiously and covertly, to the point where even legal measures are insufficient. The severity of the situation in the city has not decreased in recent times.”
In another report from the “Mountain Headquarters of Serbian Chetnik Units of Herzegovina” dated June 6, 1942, which states that the “Chetniks have lost patience” and have “begun purging the plague from the flock,” the following was also written:
“The Mountain Headquarters of the Chetniks has taken notice that Mostar is a den of bandits and murderers of the Serbian people. We will soon visit Mostar with our brave units, destroy these dens of bandits, and not a single criminal, assassin, or arsonist will escape us. Even if they hide in rat holes, Chetnik vengeance will find them there.”
Assassination Attempt on Radmilo Grđić
One of the significant armed actions was the assassination attempt on Radmilo Grđić, the former General Secretary of the Yugoslav Sokol Association and the responsible editor of the pro-regime Sarajevo daily “Jugoslovenska pošta.”
Grđić had come to Mostar, as he wrote to Vojislav Samardžić and Simo Tupanjanin in Trebinje through his courier, a certain Gojko Mišeljić, on behalf of the command of the Chetnik detachments in Bosnia and Herzegovina. His mission was to improve cooperation between these detachments and the Italian occupying forces and to establish a direct connection with the Italian General Lusano.
The Local Committee of the Communist Party had already decided that Grđić should be physically eliminated. In early April 1942, Adem Buć, on behalf of the Committee, assigned this task to Vasilije Maslo and a group of his comrades. Together with Zijo Ševo, they developed the operation plan.
Since eliminating Grđić with a revolver was ruled out—fearing that gunfire would alert the police and the Carabinieri too soon—it was decided that the assassination would be carried out using cold weapons. A detailed plan was drawn up, assigning specific roles to each participant. Maslo was to carry out the attack, Gojko Uljarević was to accompany him, and Hivzija Behram was to secure their retreat.
On the first evening, at dusk, they waited for him outside the Santić house, where he was staying. They expected him to return home soon. (Directly across from this house was the so-called “Crooked Alley,” Ramićeva Street—a favorable escape route, as it prevented long-range gunfire and led directly to Bjelušine, from where it was not far to flee into the Stolac hills and then into Velež). However, that evening, Grđić did not return home before the police curfew, forcing the group to withdraw.
(To be continued…)
Source: Borba
Nusret Seferović: The Partisan Mostar Part 5
The next day, Grđić went to the house of Rade Golubović and did not leave until curfew. That day, instead of Behram, Ibro Džaferović was supposed to secure the escape route. Once again, the action was postponed to the following day.
On the third day, as night was falling, Grđić was walking toward his apartment. However, the circumstances for carrying out the attack were far from ideal. Approaching from the opposite direction was a patrol of Carabinieri, and nearby, in front of the basement of a private house used by the Italian army as a storage facility, an armed soldier stood guard.
The assassins hesitated, but the attack could no longer be delayed. Maslo crossed to the sidewalk on the side where Grđić was walking, and as he came close to him, he launched the attack.
By the time the Carabinieri realized something had happened and opened fire, the assassins had already disappeared into “Krivi sokak” (Crooked Alley).
In the previously mentioned report by the police chief to the Directorate for Public Order and Security in Zagreb, the Ustaša Surveillance Service in Zagreb, and the Great County of Hum in Mostar, the event was described as follows:
“On the evening of April 7, at around 20:15, an unknown person ambushed Luka Radmilo Grđić on the street and struck him three times on the head with an axe. The aforementioned individual was transported by the Italian military authorities to an Italian military hospital, where he remains. The wound is of a serious nature. Following the assassination, the Italian military authorities blocked access to the scene, and the officials sent by our administration were unable to gather the necessary information.
The Assassination Attempt on Stjepan Barbarić
On the same day, a little later, another assassination attempt was made. Police Chief Mato Roko reported to his superiors:
“On the 7th of this month, at around 21:50, the secretary of the Great County of Hum in Mostar, Stjepan Barbarić, was in the company of police officer Andrija Kordić at the corner of Crkvena Street near the Šemovac Bridge in Mostar. At a distance of about 30 meters, two young men were spotted on a bicycle, and one of them threw an object toward Barbarić and Kordić, but it struck an electric pole. After throwing the object, the young men fled, and the police officer pursued them, firing one shot from his pistol as they did not stop when ordered to.”
“The next day, on the 8th of this month at around 7:30 AM, a commercial assistant named Ibrahim Gološ handed over a dismantled defensive hand grenade to a district officer in Crkvena Street. He had found it behind the fence of Bajgorić’s wood storage near the pole where the thrown object had landed. However, the young men who threw the grenade could not be found. Investigations are ongoing, and a report will be provided in due time if any progress is made.”
Since this attempt failed, another assassination attempt on Barbarić was organized a few days later. The deputy head of the County Police Department, Grgić, reported:
“On April 22 of this year, at around 21:10, Stjepan Barbarić, secretary of the Great County of Hum in Mostar, was returning home. As he reached the entrance of his house in Predhum Street, two hand grenades were thrown at him—one an Italian offensive grenade and the other a defensive grenade of former Yugoslav military origin. The Italian grenade exploded two meters away from Barbarić, while the other grenade failed to detonate. Barbarić was not injured in the attack. Two individuals were spotted as the attackers, but they were not recognized, and the ongoing investigation could not determine their identities.
The Assassination Attempt on Sulejman Bašagić
The day after the second attempted assassination on Barbarić, another attack was carried out on a prominent Ustaša member. The head of law enforcement reported the incident to the Directorate for Public Order and Security in Zagreb, the Ustaša Supervisory Service (Office 1, Department PO) in Zagreb, and the Great County of Hum in Mostar:
“On April 23 of this year, at around 21:30, unknown individuals fired a shot from a pistol at Sulejman Bašagić, former mayor of Nevesinje and a prominent Ustaša collaborator. There were two attackers. Bašagić was wounded by two shots—one in the left arm and the other in the left side of his back…
Two individuals were spotted as the attackers, but they were not recognized or found. It is beyond doubt that the attack was carried out by communists.”
The Assassination Attempt on Dobrosav Jevđević
Several attempts were made in Mostar to eliminate Chetnik commander Dobrosav Jevđević. Mustafa Alikalfić-Brko, along with a group of comrades, carried out two operations, but Jevđević always managed to take cover at the last moment, resulting in others from his entourage or company being killed instead.
Regarding one of these assassination attempts on Jevđević, the “Incident Report for the Past 15 Days” states:
*”On May 29 at 9:05 PM, unknown individuals threw two bombs in front of the ‘Neretva’ Hotel in Mostar… In pursuit of the perpetrators, Italian carabinieri and local police arrested two suspects: Meho Tačkov, a worker, and Stjepan Sasa, a janitor, both from Mostar.
During the interrogation of the suspects in front of the ‘Neretva’ Hotel, another bomb was thrown at the gathering, causing those present to scatter, including the detainees Sasa and Tačkov. The carabinieri opened fire as they fled, wounding Sasa, who succumbed to his injuries later that night.”*
Assassination Attempt on Vinko Malvić
The youth of Mostar carried out several more armed actions in the city. Sulejman Ćišić, a student at the teacher’s school, along with his group, which included young women, successfully carried out an assassination attempt on the Ustaša professor Vinko Malvić, firing eight revolver shots at him.
The previously mentioned Captain Drobac, in his regular “Deputy Report for the Past 15 Days,” reported on April 29, 1942, that an assassination attempt had been carried out on Vinko Malvić, stating:
“Professor Malvić is a prominent Ustaša fighter, and it is believed that the assassination attempt was politically motivated and carried out by communists.”
Following this attack, the authorities took even stricter measures—
“…they arrested several comrades, banned movement after 8 PM, and prohibited the formation of groups of more than four people, with the warning that they would shoot without warning. They stationed numerous Carabinieri patrols at intersections and along roads, both mobile and stationary, blockaded the side of the city where the route for dispatching detachments runs, and began surrounding the city with wire…” reported Džemal Bijedić from the Provincial Committee of the Party.
The same report also states that following the assassination attempt on Grđić, “over 20 comrades and their families were arrested,” and that “these arrests were carried out by the Italians.” Meanwhile, after the attacks on Barbarić and Bašagić, “the Croatian authorities” made the arrests.
Despite the fact that “after each action, a wave of repression follows, cutting down our most active comrades,” the masses supported these actions, with only a small number opposing them. The fear among the Ustaše, Chetniks, and spies was so great that “after 6 PM, not a single one of them dared to appear on the streets.” Overall, after these actions, the prevailing opinion was that “there was no place left for such people anywhere.” Many had already begun fleeing from Mostar.
(To be continued…)
SOURCE (Borba)
Nusret Seferović: The Partisan Mostar Part 6
Assassination Attempt on Police Agent Mujo Trbonja
At the beginning of 1943, during the occupiers’ and Chetniks’ preparations for an offensive against our forces in Bosnia, Dalmatia, and Lika, the Party organization in Mostar was planning another assassination attempt on Jevđević. The preparations were led by Salko Šestić. However, the attempt was accidentally thwarted. At the request of the Chetnik command, the police carried out mass arrests of young activists, during which Šestić was also captured.
He was brutally tortured in police custody but did not reveal anything. One night, after an interrogation, as he was being escorted back to his cell, he summoned his last strength and punched his guard before attempting to escape. He ran out of the prison courtyard onto the street, but, exhausted and weakened, he failed to get away. The guards caught up with him and killed him. His murder shook the entire city. Prominent citizens and the general public demanded a public funeral. However, to avoid demonstrations, he was buried at night. Every night, young activists visited his grave, decorating it with flowers, which the police would scatter the next day. In response, they began placing a dagger (kama) on his grave as a symbol of revenge.
Soon after, right in front of the police station, the Mostar police agent Mujo Trbonja, known as “Kosmajac,” was assassinated.
The police chief’s report on the assassination stated:
“On the 1st of this month, at 9:15 PM, in King Tomislav Street in Mostar, as he was exiting the Kapetanović kiosk, two shots from a 9mm pistol were fired at police scout Mustafa Trbonja. The assassin was riding a two-wheeler. Noticing T.M. exiting the kiosk, he fired two shots at him, abandoned the bicycle, and fled down King Tomislav Street, escaping through a small alley into the Neretva riverbed.
The description of the assassin matched that of Šefkija Bošnjić, leading to justified suspicion that he had carried out the assassination of Mustafa Trbonja in revenge for Salko Šestić’s death (Report No. 288/43). In communist circles, it was said that Trbonja was the one who had killed Šestić, although this was not true.”
The assassination was actually carried out by Petar Krajina, a worker at the railway workshop, not Šefkija Bošnjić. The police came to the wrong conclusion based on a found bicycle. While preparing for the attack, a group of comrades had temporarily “confiscated” a bicycle—taking it from the street while its owner, Šefkija Bošnjić, was inside a shop. This practice was common in Mostar, where bicycles were used for certain operations and later discreetly returned to their owners. Before such actions, the bicycle’s serial number was typically removed, replaced, or repainted. However, this time, because the bicycle was a brand-new sports model, the police easily identified its owner. They failed, however, to arrest Bošnjić. He was warned in time, went into hiding, and soon joined the Partisan detachment. He was later killed during the Fifth Offensive.
Following Šestić’s murder and Trbonja’s assassination, the atmosphere in Mostar became so tense that the police did not dare to carry out any reprisals. They knew that such actions could trigger mass protests or even new assassinations, which they wanted to avoid at all costs. From then on, for nearly a month, no one was arrested. Policemen and agents disappeared from the streets as soon as darkness fell. Ongoing investigations were halted, and the accused were either handed over to the Italian military court or sent to the Mamula prison.
Fire at the Tobacco Factory
On June 5, 1942, an act of sabotage was carried out at the tobacco factory. The fire was noticed around 4 PM, after the workers had already left the premises, resulting in the complete destruction of a large warehouse building. In response, a thorough investigation was launched, after which “the Italian authorities, in retaliation, executed five confirmed supporters of the Partisans…”
The burning of the tobacco factory warehouse was the most significant act of sabotage, but there were countless smaller yet equally important ones. The enemy responded with ruthless and brutal punishments for any sabotage, no matter how minor, especially before and after the battles at Sutjeska and Zelengora in 1943. The German SS Division “Prinz Eugen,” headquartered in Mostar, had special authorization from its command to deal with such acts, as its commander later testified during trials after the liberation. However, even then, the occupiers failed to instill fear in Mostar’s patriotic citizens to the point that they would cease their actions and resistance against the occupation.
Public Hanging
During those days, the police chief, Roko, reported to the General Directorate for Public Works and Security in Zagreb:
*”On November 16, 1943, in the morning, an unknown perpetrator cut the telegraph cable of the German armed forces in Mostar, on Dr. Starčević Street, at the railway crossing. The investigation was conducted solely by the German military authorities. Since this act was an act of sabotage committed by communist individuals, the General Command of the Mountain Corps in Mostar decided that five people, each of whom had a close relative among the Partisans in the forest, would be publicly hanged.
Based on this decision, the following individuals from Mostar were hanged this morning on Ustaška Street in front of the District Office building: Mujo Babić, of the Islamic faith, Božo Skočajić, of the Orthodox faith, Ekrem Ćurić, of the Islamic faith, Darinka Bitanga, of the Roman Catholic faith, Tomo Kljujić, of the Orthodox faith, originally from Metković.”*
* This refers to Darinka Bitanga, the wife of Rade Bitanga, a graphic worker who was a union member before World War I and a member of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) since its founding. He was sentenced to three years in prison alongside a group led by Gojko Vuković, serving his sentence in Sremska Mitrovica. At one point before 1980, he was the secretary of the Local Committee of the Party in Mostar.
In 1938, he was a candidate on the Workers’ Party list for the Mostar District. Before the war, he was arrested and, along with a group of comrades, sent to the Lepoglava concentration camp. The Ustaše later murdered him in Jasenovac. His son was killed in 1943. Only his daughter, Nada, lived to see the victory of the revolution.
A member of the Supreme HQ in Mostar
In the autumn of 1942, Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo set out from Tuzla to Sarajevo, intending to cross into Bosanska Krajina to report to Tito on the progress and challenges of the National Liberation Struggle in eastern Bosnia. However, upon reaching Sarajevo, he abandoned the plan to travel via Banja Luka and instead decided to go through Mostar.
He wanted to brief Tito on the state of the Mostar organization and the situation in Herzegovina. Thus, Tempo arrived in Mostar—possibly during the most difficult period for Herzegovina.
His comrades in Sarajevo secured forged documents for him. He received an identification card under the name Stanislav Valinac, a 32-year-old “technical forestry trainee.” His place of birth was listed as Bar, and his workplace as Sarajevo, Terebašinova Street 8.
Along with his ID, his comrades obtained a firearm permit for him:
“Mr. Stanislav Valinac, technical trainee, is authorized under the Forest Law, the Firearms Carrying Law of October 14, 1928, Article 16 of the Enforcement Regulations of the same law from January 1, 1928, and the Order of the Ministry of Forestry and Mining No. 13197 from July 30, 1941, to possess and carry a 6.85mm ‘Walther’ pistol, factory number 17412.”
Additionally, he had a railway discount card under the same name. A separate document explained the reason for his travel: by order of the Directorate of State Forests, he had to “urgently” and officially travel from Sarajevo to Mostar.
At that time in Mostar, more than ever before or after, the National Liberation Movement had an organized intelligence and surveillance network to track the movements of police, Ustaše, occupation forces, and their collaborators. These operations were mostly carried out by SKOJ (League of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia) activists, organized by neighborhoods or streets. Duty stations were set up at key points in each district. If anything suspicious was noticed, the sentry would report to their liaison (usually a member of the district SKOJ committee), who coordinated multiple such stations. If deemed necessary, this information was relayed further.
This system ensured an automatic “mobilization” process, signaling others. By the time a response arrived from higher ranks—i.e., the Party organization (cells)—everything was already prepared for action. The entire process usually took about 10 minutes. In urgent situations where waiting 10–15 minutes was impossible, immediate action was permitted.
Whenever such actions were taken, as far as I know, they were never mistaken. Typically, they occurred when police patrols or agents attempted to arrest a comrade on the street, ambush someone to detain them, or block a house where a meeting was being held or an illegal activist resided. Each of these activist groups was armed to some extent and always ready to take action against the enemy when needed.
There were numerous instances where these daring actions in the middle of the city, even in broad daylight, were completely successful. The arrested individual either managed to escape, or the police were disrupted from achieving their objective due to a timely “alarm.”
However, on that particular day, a mistake could have been made—with tragic consequences…
“A suspicious individual”
A group of SKOJ (League of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia) members in Gornja Street noticed an “unknown” man who had arrived in Mostar. He was walking from Carina, coming from Zalik, heading towards Musala, where a police prison was located nearby.
Among the observers were some members of the SKOJ district committee, who found him “particularly suspicious”. They noticed that he was hurriedly following a woman dressed in a zar (face covering), in whom they recognized Mila (the pseudonym of Olga Marasović).
(To be continued…)
SOURCE (Borba)
Nusret Seferović: The Partisan Mostar Part 7
Bilo mi je “kao dan” jasno šta treba da čine. Ali, kad je trebalo da “neprijatelj” bude napadnut, u blizini se zatekao jedan od članova Mesnog komiteta Partije koji je akciju sprečio. Tempo je upravo tada, sledeći Milu, prelazio u drugi stan jer iz razloga opasnosti, nije mogao više da ostane u prvom.
After spending several days in Mostar, Tempo decided to proceed to the Supreme Headquarters. He personally met with comrades responsible for organizing his transfer. One option was to fight their way out of the city with a group of armed comrades, passing through villages under strong Ustaše influence, which had previously been traversed by a detachment from Mostar. This was the shortest route and the simplest method to leave the city, but not the safest. The second option involved disguising Tempo as a railway worker and transporting him in the conductor’s carriage to Ostrožac, and from there by train to Seonica, where a patrol from the Partisan units would receive him. This was one of the safest connections between Mostar and their forces. Many Mostar residents had taken this route to join the Partisans when their forces were around Prozor. It was possible to arrange for the entire train crew, from the engineer to the brakeman, to consist either of Party members or strong sympathizers, with at least some of them armed. Tempo chose the third option.
Tempo took a car to Ostrožac
The Local Committee of the Party sent Sula Mehmedbašić, a committee member, to Stolac to obtain a pass for free movement under the name of a certain merchant. Once this was arranged, Tempo drove by car to Ostrožac and then proceeded to Seonica, where he was supposed to be met by a patrol from the Fifth Montenegrin Brigade. However, the patrol was not at the designated spot. What to do? He ventured alone through unfamiliar terrain towards Prozor, around which the Fifth Montenegrin and Tenth Herzegovinian Brigades were located. After a long journey, he stopped at a house slightly off the village path. Although the entire area was not completely under their army’s control, the villages were already connected to the national liberation movement. In that house, Tempo rested, was fed, and spent the night. In the morning, the villager led him to the nearest Partisan patrol. It was a patrol from the Mostar Battalion. The patrol accepted the “merchant-courier” (he had introduced himself to the villager as a “merchant,” and the villager saw him as a “courier” camouflaged with a merchant’s identification, so he handed him over to the connection as such) but with suspicion. They had many bad experiences with such merchants in the field, especially before enemy offensives. Nevertheless, the patrol fulfilled its duty and escorted him to their headquarters. Thus, Tempo arrived at Oštrelj on November 7, 1942, where at that time Comrade Tito and the Supreme Headquarters were located.
Ustaše-German Mass Raid to Capture Battalion Fighters in the City
The Ustaše and German police learned that, after battles on the Sutjeska and Zelengora, some fighters from the Mostar Battalion had returned to Mostar. They assumed that, for most, this was their only immediate way to avoid falling into enemy hands and that, as soon as they recovered, they would leave the city again to rejoin the Tenth Herzegovinian Brigade. This assumption was correct. However, the problem for the enemy was that the fighters received unanimous support from the city’s population. They were taken in and sheltered in homes. Doctors collaborating with the National Liberation Movement examined and treated them, as many were sick, wounded, and exhausted.
Since the Ustaše and German police could not locate a single partisan in the city through their informants, they resorted to their last remaining option—conducting a mass raid on civilians. But before that, they hoped to achieve something through intimidation. Having recently crushed a detachment of Mostar fighters near Kaluđer Bunar, burned down the village of Orašje, and massacred everyone they found there—56 men, women, elderly, and children—the Germans posted announcements throughout the city warning that the same fate awaited anyone in Mostar who supported or participated in the National Liberation Struggle. Yet, even this did not deter the resistance!
At the beginning of July 1943, the Ustaše police, along with the Germans, definitively decided to carry out a mass raid in the city districts where they suspected the Mostar Battalion fighters were hiding.
“On July 11, 1943, before dawn,” Roko reported to his superiors, “the German armed forces occupied parts of Mostar, including the neighborhoods of Predhum, Luka, and Zahum. They arrested all males aged 14 and older and took them to the southern camp, where they were subjected to individual interrogations in the presence of two scouts from this area and the commander of the police station. uring this process, several individuals who had been in the forest were identified—these were the ones for whom the raid had been
carried out in the first place. Additionally, a larger number of individuals were found to have sheltered these returning partisans, bringing the total number of detainees to 36. All detainees were then escorted under German guard to the judicial authorities in Mostar.”
Raca Gnjatić in Front of the Line of Captives
Out of more than 400 fighters hiding in those districts, the enemy managed to capture only seven, as police agents, with the help of a provocateur, identified them as pre-war communists.
Here, it is important to mention the following detail. That same evening, independently of this raid and in another part of the city, Raca Gnjatić-Ivanišević was accidentally arrested. She had also come to Mostar after the battles on Sutjeska. The police brought her to the southern camp. She was the only woman arrested that night.
They forced her to walk from man to man and point out “who was a partisan” and “who was a sympathizer.” She passed in front of the line of captives, moving from one man to another, in front of several hundred people, with her head held high—and she said nothing. They beat her and forced her to walk the line again, demanding that she say “this one, this one…” Yet, with the same pride, she passed once more in front of her comrades and fellow citizens. They did not attempt a third time. Instead, they took her away and executed her immediately, not even waiting to finish their “selection of suspects.”
A few days after the raid, the captured partisans and selected civilians from the southern camp were executed in Mostarsko blato.
To further terrorize the population, the Germans publicly hanged two young communists in the city center, in the square in front of Hotel Neretva.
In the aforementioned report, Mate Roko further states:
“Today, on the 15th of this month, at 4 AM, the German military court carried out the execution of Drago Palavestra, an 18-year-old student of Orthodox faith, and Alija Rizikalo, a 21-year-old carpenter from Mostar. They were sentenced to death for participating in the partisans and promoting communism among the youth. Both Palavestra and Rizikalo, during their trial, at the announcement of their sentence, and even at the gallows, shouted: ‘Long live the Communist Party of Yugoslavia! Long live the Soviet Union!’”
The People’s Loan
From the beginning of 1942 until the liberation, an illegal National Liberation Committee operated continuously in Mostar.
The first registration for the People’s Loan was organized by the committee in mid-March 1943. The process was carried out in a way that Daniel Samokovlić, the director of the bank, withdrew a certain number of banknotes of 1, 10, and 100 kuna of a specific series from circulation. These kuna notes served as securities—for example, 1 kuna of a designated series represented 100 kuna of registered loan, and so on.
This method ensured the safety of those participating in the loan, as there was no need to record their names on any list. A subscriber to the People’s Loan only needed to keep the kuna notes they received as proof of their deposit (through their local Committee for National Aid or the National Liberation Front) until the liberation. Afterward, they could present these kuna notes to the National Bank for repayment.
Formally, the notes looked the same as regular currency, and only the City National Liberation Committee knew the exact numbers and series. It was agreed that the bearer of these notes would be repaid with an interest rate of 3% per year. The loan was based on a gold standard, specifically on the value of a Napoléon gold coin, which at that time had a free-market exchange rate of 1:16,000 kuna. Payments were to be made after liberation according to this standard.
At the end of 1944, Daniel Samokovlić smuggled the documentation of the People’s Loan (including banknote numbers and series) onto liberated territory by hiding it inside the lining of his coat. The first People’s Loan raised 25,500,000 kuna. Later, several more rounds of the loan were successfully issued and registered.
* From Mostar to Ostrošac, Tempo was driven by chauffeur Alija Trbonja. When Trbonja returned to Mostar, he found an amber cigarette holder in the car. Ten years later, in 1953, he handed it back to Tempo when he visited Mostar again. That cigarette holder, along with a few other items, was originally sent in 1942 by comrades from Mostar as a gift to Tito. For Tempo’s illegal arrival from Sarajevo to Mostar, the Municipal Committee of the Party assigned Emina Trbonja as his contact, and he traveled with her.
** In total, around 80 fighters of the Mostar Battalion and several others from different units were hidden in the city.
SOURCE (Borba)